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ABSTRACT: Performance information attaches numbers to the inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes of public services. Numbers are what separate performance information from other 
sources of information about public sector performance. In cognitive and social psychology, 
there are vast amounts of research on the profound effects of numbers on human attitudes 
and behavior. However, these insights are largely unexplored by scholars of performance 
information. The article introduces the importance of numerical psychology for the study of 
performance information. It is pointed out how numerical research both challenges existing 
beliefs about performance information and allows for the formulation of new hypotheses. 
These insights are relevant to all levels of study, including citizens, managers, and policy 
makers. 
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Every day, from the morning paper to the evening news, Americans are served a 
steady diet of statistics. We are given the latest figures from consumer prices and 
the unemployment rate, lagging and leading economic indicators, reading 
scores, and life expectancies, not to mention data on crime, divorce, and the 
money supply. 
Alonso and Starr (1987, p. 1) 
 
Herbert Simon was keen to stress the numerical aspect of performance information and the 
implications for decisions and attitudes at the administrative level (Simon, 1937; 1939) and in 
the broader public (Simon & Ridley, 1938). Today, most definitions of performance 
information stress the quantitative aspect of measuring performance (Bouckaert & Hilligan, 
2006; Davies, 1999; Hood, 2007; James, 2011b; Moynihan, 2008; Perrin, 1998; Thomas, 
2006; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010). Drawing on this literature, we can broadly 
define performance information as any regular, systematic, and quantitative data that capture 
the inputs, actions, outputs, or outcomes of public organizations. This numerical aspect is 
also what ties modern-day performance measures together with the broader development of 
the modern state (Williams, 2003). As Eberstadt (1995, p. 2) has outlined: “What makes a 
state modern, in an important sense, is its intention to use numbers as a basis for its actions. 
The modern state is an edifice built on numbers.” This article takes the numerical aspect of 
performance information as its point of departure. It is the numerical aspect that 
fundamentally sets it apart from other informal sources of information about public services. 
However, while the central role of numbers in performance information is evident, 
performance measurement research tends to treat the numerical aspect as a black box: We do 
not put the numbers themselves under scrutiny when we set out to understand the use and 
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effects of performance information on policy makers, managers, or citizens. This article 
argues that the study of performance information will benefit greatly from opening this black 
box: How are numbers about performance different from other forms of non-numerical 
feedback? And how do managers, policy makers, and citizens make sense of various forms of 
numerical performance information? 
We can approach these questions by drawing on the vast experimental research in 
cognitive and social psychology on how human decision making and attitude formation are 
formed by numbers. As pointed out by James and John (2007, p. 568): “The connection 
between public management and political behavior has been largely neglected because the 
literatures have mostly been developed as separate areas of endeavor.” By stressing the 
psychological aspects of performance information as numbers, the efforts presented here are 
an example of a broader research agenda basing the study of performance information on 
how human information processing affects attitudes and decision making (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2005; James, 2011b). This agenda is in line with the goal already outlined by Simon 
(1955, p. 100) to place a “marking stone” between psychology and public administration in 
order to bring the two fields closer together (Olsen, 2015b). 
Methodologically, we already see a closer integration of public administration and 
psychology. Recent experimental research efforts into the effects of performance information 
are a good example of this (James, 2011a; 2011b; James & Mosely, 2014; Olsen, 2013b; 
2015b; Van Ryzin & Lavena, 2013; Van Ryzin, 2013). However, as this article will argue, a 
tighter theoretical integration of the two is also needed – and the study of the effects of 
performance information is a core example of the potential for fruitful integration of 
psychology and public administration. A view of performance information as first and 
foremost numerical information opens up at least two broad lines of research: 
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The first one asks the fundamental question of how numerical quantitative 
information about public performance affects attitudes and behaviors differently from non-
numerical and more informal sources of information. The psychology of numbers poses some 
fundamental questions of about the different impact of performance information and non-
routine feedback. The second line of inquiry focuses on how humans make sense of various 
numerical information. In particular, four aspects will be stressed: (1) human attention to 
symbolic round numbers and the leftmost-digit bias, (2) numerical equivalence framing, (3) 
numerical precision and confidence, and (4) comparison of numbers in space and time. These 
topics indicate the broad and multifaceted perspective on performance information stemming 
from a perspective informed by the psychology of numbers. The remainder of the article will 
be organized according to these two themes. They both have relevance for our understanding 
of performance information at the level of managers, policy makers, and citizens. In the 
discussion, I will turn to the question of individual differences that may alter or moderate the 
role of numbers in an administrative setting. 
 
Numbers or Cases of Performance: Abstract vs. Concrete Information 
The first important direction of research is to understand how numerical performance 
information affects citizens and managers compared with other non-numerical, informal 
sources of information. The latter are the non-routine sources of feedback ranging from 
personal experience with public services to media coverage of instances and cases (Kroll, 
2013). The performance literature has generally stressed the potency of quantitative 
information as an important aspect of performance information. For both good and bad, this 
potency is captured by the notion that “what gets measured gets done” (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992, p. 146). Suddenly, a number, score, rank, or tier can be associated with an 
organization’s performance, and this feedback exerts influence on organizations, managers, 
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and citizens. From the perspective of unintended consequences of performance information, 
we have various accounts of the potency of performance information. For instance, the notion 
of tunnel vision highlights that quantified phenomena attract management attention “at the 
expense of unquantified aspects of performance” (Smith, 1995, p. 284). From a more positive 
view of performance information, we find a similar belief in the potency of performance 
information. Holzer and Yang (2004, p. 16) have argued that performance information can 
crowd out vague and subjective ideas about performance in the public sector: “Measurement 
helps to move the basis of decision-making from personal experience to proof of measurable 
accomplishment or lack thereof.” Others stress the simplification of quantitative information 
relative to other types of information as a source of its ability to influence (Herbst, 1993). 
Espeland and Sauder (2007, p. 17) stress how numerical “information appears more robust 
and definitive than it would if presented in more complicated forms.” Simplification of 
information is seen as absorbing the uncertainties, assumptions, and contingencies of the 
underlying data (March & Simon, 1958; Stone, 1997; Moynihan, 2008). We also find the 
notion that performance information is potent because numbers seem more “sincere.” 
Performance information tends to seem more authoritative than other sources of information. 
For instance, it has been argued that performance numbers can be used to impress and 
convince politicians in budgetary negotiations (Wildavsky, 1964, p. 95). In summary, there is 
an underlying idea that performance information has the potential ability to crowd out less 
formal channels of information about performance, for better or worse. 
However, drawing on social and cognitive psychology, we find various well-
established findings that fundamentally challenge the relative potency of numbers compared 
with other types of information. Generally, scholars of performance information have 
overlooked the potency of exemplification and concreteness in attitude formation and 
decision making among both citizens and professionals. We can recognize this from our own 
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lives: Single events, anecdotes, or examples tend to stick out while abstract or general 
insights, such as statistics, tend to move to the backstage of our memories. This fundamental 
insight is at odds with the potency of performance information relative to other non-routine 
sources of information. Both citizens and policy makers have other more informal and non-
numerical sources of information at their disposal. As James (2011b, p. 402) has noted: 
“Citizens may not have much of an idea about the overall performance of a local public body 
only interacting with it on a case-by-case basis for a subset of services.” Similarly, at the 
level of managers and policy makers, we can expect numerical performance information to be 
accompanied by “nonroutine information…if something went wrong, customers complained, 
interest group called, other public entities sent letters, the media showed up” (Kroll, 2013, p. 
265). These are the “slow drip of everyday life” (Baybeck & McClurg, 2005, p. 498), which, 
together with numerical performance information, feeds into our impression about the 
performance of a service or an organization. 
Across disciplines we find rather compelling empirical and theoretical support for 
the importance of such sources of information relative to hard performance information. In 
psychology we find a long and strong tradition of comparing concrete and abstract 
information and how it affects human attitudes and decision making (Borgida & Nisbett, 
1977; Pettus & Diener, 1977). These studies indicate that detailed and personal information 
affects judgment more than statistical and general information. Some refer to this as the 
vividness effect because attention is disproportionally drawn to concrete and vividly 
described pieces of information (Zillmann, 2006). Here we can view performance 
information as less concrete, as it is an abstract aggregation of information that cannot be 
otherwise seen in the real world by the observer (Moynihan, 2008, p. 102). 
In media research, exemplification theory points to the profound use and effect of 
“vox pops” or “popular exemplars” in comparison with base-rate information. Base-rate 
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information provides quantifiable facts and figures much like those of performance 
information. The popular exemplar resembles a single case that may be representative of a 
larger group. Daschmann (2000) did an experiment comparing the strength of the two by 
offering people vox pop information and a public opinion poll. He found that “the influence 
of exemplars was considerably stronger, to the point of overriding the effects of poll results” 
(Daschmann, 2000, p. 160). These findings are echoed in framing studies in political 
psychology that compare the frame strength of episodic and thematic frames (Iyengar, 1990; 
Iyengar & Kinder, 2010). Episodic frames put a human face on political issues while thematic 
frames stress general trends and statistics. Episodic frames have been found to be more 
emotionally engaging and, in turn, more potent than thematic frames (Gross, 2008; Aarøe, 
2011). 
These examples leave us with a number of interesting questions for future research: 
Scholars of performance information need to empirically question our (assumed) beliefs 
about the potency of performance information. The vast amount of research on abstractness 
and concreteness of information requires us to take a step back and explore how performance 
information affects attitudes and behavior compared with other sources of information. 
Alternative sources of concrete information from news reports, word of mouth, or personal 
experience are still widely available to both managers and citizens. A key question for future 
research is: How potent is performance information relative to day-to-day case-based sources 
of information performance in the public sector? It also forces us to think more about the 
various emotions that performance information triggers: Can performance information be 
emotionally engaging to the same extent as a personal experience or exemplification of 
public sector performance? Finally, it draws our attention to whether political and 
administrative elites differ from citizens: Are managers and policy makers affected mainly by 
numerical information while citizens draw more on informal non-numerical performance 
8 
 
cues? The overreaching theme of these questions for future research is that while 
performance information is spreading across countries, sectors, and levels of government, we 
should not by default expect it to be the sole source of information about performance. 
Considering these questions will also help practitioners get a grip on the differences in the 
information that individuals inside and outside of the organization tend to draw inferences 
from. 
 
Numerical Variations and Performance Information 
In his seminal book The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Aron Wildavsky deals with the 
incomprehensible nature of large numbers in a political-administrative context. For instance, 
he proposes that most people would prefer to devote “quite a lot” of money to medical 
research sponsored by the federal government. However, the tricky question arises: “How 
much is that? A million, a hundred million, a billion?” (Wildavsky, 1964, p. 44). The second 
line of argument addressed here deals with how humans process numbers. The question is: 
How do we make sense of numbers, and what does this imply for the study of performance 
information? Here I will stress four dimensions of the research on numbers and how they 
relate to the study of performance information. These are (1) the importance of symbolic and 
round numbers, (2) the role of equivalence framing, (3) numerical precision and confidence, 
and (4) comparison of numbers in time and space.  
 
Round numbers and symbolic numbers 
The first line of research indicates that the finer details of numbers are often discarded when 
humans process them. The most pronounced example of this is our reliance on round 
numbers. Powers of 10 and multipliers of 10 and 5 are the numbers most frequently produced 
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by humans in everything from old written material to the World Wide Web (Dehaene & 
Mehler, 1992; Dehaene, 2011; Dorogovtsev et al., 2006). Round numbers constitute a type of 
cognitive reference point that we orient ourselves toward (Rosch, 1975). The importance of 
round numbers has also been shown in contexts that closely resemble performance 
information. For example, round numbers have been found to motivate us to enhance our 
performance in sports and education (Pope & Simonsohn, 2011). In a similar manner, we 
may expect managers or policy makers to enhance performance in order to achieve some 
symbolic (yet arbitrary) score on performance measures. Anecdotally, it is not difficult to 
think of an organization that has bragged about achieving some score (e.g., “We helped 1,000 
satisfied citizens today!”) or one being named and shamed for some profound negative 
measure (e.g., “$100 million deficit!”). It has also been found that round numbers in terms of 
categories of “top 10” or “top 20” have a major effect on consumer evaluation of rankings 
(Isaac & Schindler, 2014). In addition, public opinion on government spending depends less 
on the actual amount of spending and more on the extent to which spending exceeds certain 
round number thresholds (Malhotra & Margalit, 2010). 
The latter case is an example of the leftmost-digit bias, which denotes that we tend 
to partially discard digits as we process numbers from left to right (Hinrichs, Berie, & Mosell 
1982; Thomas & Morwitz, 2005). This implies an overreliance on the leftmost digit of 
multidigit numbers. The broader implication of this is a high degree of sensitivity to changes 
in the leftmost digit in our judgment about numbers. In fact, this line of research has recently 
been tested for public sector performance information. Olsen (2013b) found a leftmost-digit 
bias in an experiment among a representative sample of citizens where the participants were 
asked to evaluate schools according to their yearly grade average. The results showed that the 
second digit of the simple double-digit grade information was largely discarded in the 
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evaluations. Accordingly, grade of 6.0 and 6.9 were evaluated to be equally good. A school’s 
evaluations changed discontinuously only as the leftmost digit changed, e.g. from 6.9 to 7.0. 
How may future studies of performance information be informed by these insights? 
They challenge us to look for symbolic reference points in numbers that disproportionally 
affect managerial efforts and citizens’ beliefs about performance (Olsen, 2013a). We may ask 
whether managers and public employees behave differently when measured performance is 
just below or above a symbolic round number. This question could help identify both 
motivational factors connected to numbers and also potential gaming behavior as a function 
of discontinuous stakes attached to numbers (Smith, 1995). More broadly, this line of 
research forces us to think more carefully about the unconscious effects that numbers might 
have on both citizens and managers independent of the underlying phenomenon they capture. 
 
Numerical equivalence framing 
A second line of research focuses on the implications of the results from equivalence framing 
experiments that show how respondents respond differently when assigned logically 
equivalent pieces of numerical information (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). The 
underlying explanation is that individuals encode information according to its descriptive 
valance, which in turn makes either positive or negative associations more accessible in 
memory. This implies that when we hear about “dissatisfaction”, “death rates”, or 
“unemployment”, negative associations move to the foreground, while performance in terms 
of “satisfaction”, “survival rates”, or “employment” leads to more positive associations. This 
process induces valence-consistent shifts in our evaluation of performance information—
even if the underlying performance is the exact same. A recent illustration of this is an 
experimental study of the effects of presenting hospital satisfaction survey results to citizens 
as either “satisfaction rates” or “dissatisfaction rates” (Olsen, 2015a). Presenting results as a 
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10% dissatisfaction rate instead of a logically equivalent 90% satisfaction rate resulted in a 
drop of one standard deviation in citizens’ average evaluation of hospital services. 
The psychological studies of equivalence framing have implications for our 
assumptions about how fragile the effect of performance information is. We should take note 
of how seemingly similar ways of presenting performance information can have vastly 
different impacts. This raises an important question for future research and practitioners: 
How can we provide performance information to citizens in a way that makes them less 
susceptible to framing effects? Furthermore, in the world of performance information, 
managers and policy makers have some leverage in terms of how numbers are presented. 
This also raises an important question for future research about the framing of performance 
information and blame avoidance (Johnsen, 2012): To what extent do administrative and 
political elites actively frame performance in ways that might provide citizens with a more 
positive impression of performance? 
 
Precision and confidence in numbers 
Another highly relevant perspective is research on cues stemming from numerical precision. 
In the discussion on numbers versus anecdotes, we saw the sentiment reflected that numbers 
can seem more scientific and thoughtful (Herbst, 1993). However, among numbers there can 
also be various implicit cues that may strengthen our belief in them. Numerical precision is 
one such cue. Research in marketing and social psychology indicates that humans rely on 
numerical precision when forming decisions and attitudes based on numerical information. 
The central finding here is that our confidence in numbers is affected by their precision 
(Janiszewski & Uy, 2008). From the theory of conversational logic, we expect 
communicators to apply a level of precision that reflects the accuracy of their knowledge 
(Grice, 1975; Mason et al., 2013; Zhang & Schwarz, 2013). Accordingly, the level of 
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precision implicitly informs us about the level of accuracy of the knowledge underlying a 
measure. However, precision has no effect on our judgment if the communicator is viewed as 
untrustworthy, self-interested, or incompetent (Zhang & Schwarz, 2013). 
The line of research on numerical precision offers some important questions to 
scholars of performance information. Recently, there has been a focus on how the source of 
performance information may affect its impact on citizens (Van Ryzin, 2007; Van Ryzin & 
Lavena, 2013). With the precision cue in mind, our attention must be extended to how aspects 
of the numbers themselves affect citizens’ beliefs about them. Do citizens perceive precise 
performance information as confidence in performance measurement accuracy? It raises the 
question whether managers and policy makers use precision and round numbers strategically 
in order to make information look more scientific and accurate than what is actually 
warranted by the data. This may help explain why performance information in many 
instances has been presented with a level of detail that is unwarranted by the uncertainty of 
the data (Goldstein & Spiegelhalter, 1996; Bird et al., 2005; Jacobs, Goddard, & Smith, 
2005). Here lies a task for future research to explore the potential motivations for variation in 
the precision of performance information that is published to the public. From practitioners’ 
point of view, these insights stress the importance of paying careful attention to how the 
numerical precision of an organization’s performance information carries implicit cues to the 
intended audience about organizational confidence in the measure’s validity. 
 
Comparison of numbers in space and time 
A final line of inquiry stresses the importance of comparison between numbers. In isolation 
even the simplest indicators are difficult for citizens to judge without evoking a reference 
point (Mussweiler, 2003). Is a 5% unemployment rate high or low? Is a top-100 school doing 
well enough? Will I let myself undergo surgery at a hospital with a patient satisfaction rate of 
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95.7%? At face value, these may seem like simple questions, yet in providing an answer, we 
tend to draw on some point of reference: What is the unemployment rate in neighboring 
states? How well did the school do last year? What is the average satisfaction rate of similar 
hospitals? When confronted with performance data, we seek out sources for comparisons. 
Simon (1939, p. 106) was well aware of this process: “The only sound basis for decisions 
about numbers is numerical factual information about past experiences or the experiences of 
others nothing more nor less than comparative statistics.” This distinction between 
(historical) comparison in time and (social) comparison with others has long been established 
in social psychology (Albert, 1977; Festinger, 1954). Very recent research on performance 
information has also tried to understand how citizens attend to various benchmarks when 
making judgments about public services. One interesting finding here is that social reference 
points tend to affect attitudes about performance more than historical or absolute ones 
(Charbonneau & Van Ryzin, 2013; Olsen, 2013c; Hansen, Olsen, & Bech, 2014). That is, we 
care more about the performance of other states, municipalities, or organizations relative to 
our own jurisdiction than historical developments over the course of time. 
 The potential importance of reference points leaves us with a number of unanswered 
questions. A major task in the coming years is to identify the benchmarks that citizens and 
managers apply, consciously or unconsciously, when making decisions related to public 
services. In a real-world political-administrative setting, multiple potential reference points 
are available; which factors affect what type of reference points that are drawn on in such a 
complex setting? Research on citizens’ use of reference points may also inform practitioners 
about how to provide benchmarks that are intuitive and useful to citizens. However, as also 
noted for the other topics, it also raises the question of the extent to which policy makers 
strategically can manipulate the reference points that their organization is measured against. 
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Discussion: Implications and Cross-cutting Themes 
In the above, I stressed five areas of research on the effects of performance information in 
which the vast existing body of research in cognitive and social psychology offers insights 
with high immediate relevance to our field. Here I will stress some cross-cutting implications 
for future research into the effects of performance information on both citizens and policy 
makers. 
 Future research in our field must to some extent be either informed by or consistent 
with the vast psychological research on how numerical information affects human decision 
making. There are no good reasons to reject the idea that fundamental psychological aspects 
of human number processing affect behavior and attitudes in administrative settings (Simon, 
1955). While the themes discussed here might seem like a wide extension of current research 
efforts, they should rather be seen as attempt to narrow and sharpen our scope of 
investigation when studying performance information. We can ask better scientific questions 
about how performance information affects attitudes and behavior if our point of departure is 
the strong experimental findings obtained by cognitive and social psychology. From the 
above we now have an awareness of how symbolic numbers, performance measure valence, 
precision cues, or reference points can induce major shifts in how performance information is 
perceived. Considerations about such effects should feed into our own analysis of how 
performance information works in a particular context. We can use these insights to improve 
our hypotheses, inform our experimental designs, and resolve potential counterintuitive or 
less robust findings. 
 Another cross-cutting theme with implications for future research is the 
individual differences in the effects of numbers between citizens and policy makers. At first 
glance, the psychology of numbers challenges us to take a step back and look closer at the 
more fundamental aspects of human processing of performance information. It provides a set 
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of concepts and established facts about numerical cognition that span across different 
contexts and actors. However, psychology also provides us with alternative theories about 
when to expect that decision contexts and individual characteristics affect the use of 
numerical cues. On example of this is how differences in abilities to work with numbers 
affect how susceptible we are to numerical framing effects (Steen, 1997; Peters et al., 2006). 
Another example points to the importance of expertise and alternative sources of information 
as moderators of how individuals are affected by performance information (Olsen, 2015a). 
This also points to the more practical implications of integrating psychology into the study of 
performance information: It turns our focus to how different actors in the administrative 
setting are affected by numbers. This has the opportunity to inform our use of performance 
information in order to affect attitudes or behavior depending on the receiver’s abilities or 
incentives. Here lies also an important contribution to psychology from scholars of 
performance information. Performance information allows for the study of numbers on many 
dimensions, from managers’ use of numbers to how laymen make sense of them. It also spans 
many levels of analysis, from individuals over organizations to how sectors and societies are 
formed by numerical aspects of performance information. Performance information scholars 
therefore have a unique opportunity to “report back” to the broader psychological study of 
numbers. This allows us to understand the external validity of how hypotheses about 
numerical cognition, often devised in the lab, extend to important decisions about public 
services in the real world of administrative decision making. 
A final direction for future research is the potential for gaming or strategic use of 
performance information, which has been noted across the various themes. Given what we 
outlined above, we see a greatly expanded number of ways in which measured organizations 
can affect external perception of their performance. Organizations can use numerical or 
nonnumerical performance information given the emotional response they intend to induce. 
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Organizations can change the valence of a performance measure or try to affect the reference 
points that those using the information draw on. And finally, organizations can choose to 
report certain symbolic or precise numbers in order to implicitly communicate achievements 
and downplay failures. Indeed, Moynihan (2008, p. 107) has noted how the numerical aspect 
of performance information can be used strategically as “actors seeking to maximize the 
impact of numbers will usually present them in a way that downplay rival interpretations.” 
With the psychology of numbers, we are handed some testable expectations about how 
organizations might choose to report their performance. This calls for future “forensic” 
studies on how performance information is reported given various incentives to present the 
data in certain ways. 
 
Conclusion 
Performance information is, at its core, an attempt to put numbers on the inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes of public services. It is the numerical aspect that fundamentally sets it apart from 
other informal sources of information about public services. This article has argued that this 
simple fact implies that scholars of performance information must engage with the long 
tradition in cognitive and social psychology of studying how numbers affect humans. Doing 
so provides us with a vast number of strong experimental results that are highly relevant to 
the study of performance information at all levels of government and across policy areas. 
Specifically, the article has stressed two central themes of research: 
The first theme asks about the relative potency of performance information in terms 
of effects on attitudes and behavior relative to other nonnumerical and informal forms of 
information. Numerous studies across the fields of social and political psychology stress the 
relative strength of concrete, personalized types of information compared with abstract and 
general information like performance information. Scholars of performance information need 
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to do more empirical work on the different ways in which formal, numerical performance 
information affects attitudes and behavior compared with informal, case-based feedback 
about performance. What sets the effect of performance information apart from feedback 
obtained via day-by-day interactions? The second theme includes a vast literature on 
cognitive and social aspects of numbers and how these insights may inform our 
understanding of how managers and citizens make sense of performance information. In 
particular, four aspects were outlined, namely (1) human attention to round numbers and the 
leftmost-digit bias, (2) numerical equivalence framing, (3) numerical precision and 
confidence, and (4) comparison of numbers in space and time. Taken together, these aspects 
turn our attention to other possible effects of performance information that would otherwise 
have been ignored. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The research was made possible with grant 0602–02577B from the Danish Council for 
Independent Research. I would like to thank participants at a talk at Rutgers University–
Newark on October 14, 2014, for valuable comments on the ideas presented here. Comments 
from the editor Étienne Charbonneau and two anonymous referees have also helped improve 
the manuscript. Any remaining errors are my own. 
 
REFERENCES 
Aarøe, L. (2011). Investigating frame strength: The case of episodic and thematic frames. 
Political Communication, 28(2), 207–26. 
Albert, S. (1977). Temporal comparison theory. Psychological Review, 84(6), 485–503. 
Alonso, W., & Starr, P. (1987). The politics of numbers. New York, NY: Russell Sage 
Foundation Publications. 
18 
 
Baybeck, B., & McClurg, S.D. (2005). What do they know and how do they know it? An 
examination of citizen awareness of context. American Politics Research, 33(4), 492–520. 
Baumgartner, F.R., & Jones, B.D. (2005). The politics of attention: How government 
prioritizes problems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Bird, S.M.; David, C.; Farewell, V.T.; Harvey, G.; Tim, H.; & Smith, P.C. (2005). 
Performance indicators: Good, bad, and ugly. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series 
A (Statistics in Society), 168(1), 1–27. 
Borgida, E., & Nisbett, R.E. (1977). The differential impact of abstract vs. concrete 
information on decisions. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 7(3), 258–71. 
Bouckaert, G., & Halligan, J. (2006). Performance and performance management. In B.G. 
Peter & J. Pierre (Ed.), Handbook of Public Policy, (pp. 443–59). London: SAGE 
Publications. 
Charbonneau, É., & Van Ryzin, G.G. (2013). Benchmarks and citizen judgments of local 
government performance: Findings from a survey experiment. Public Management 
Review,17(2), 288–304. 
Daschmann, G. (2000). Vox pop & polls: The impact of poll results and voter statements in 
the media on the perception of a climate of opinion. International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research, 12(2), 160–81. 
Davies, I.C. (1999). Evaluation and performance management in government. Evaluation, 
5(2), 150–59. 
Dehaene, S. (2011). The number sense: How the mind creates mathematics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Dehaene, S., & Mehler, J. (1992). Cross-linguistic regularities in the frequency of number 
words. Cognition, 43, 1–29. 
Dorogovtsev, S.N.; Mendes, J.F.F.; & Oliveira, J.G. (2006). Frequency of occurrence of 
numbers in the World Wide Web. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 
360(2), 548–56. 
Eberstadt, N. (1995). The tyranny of numbers: Mismeasurement and misrule. Washington, 
DC: AEI Press, American Enterprise Institute. 
Espeland, W.N., & Sauder, M. (2007). Rankings and reactivity: How public measures 
recreate social worlds. American Journal of Sociology, 133(1), 1–40. 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7(2), 117–
40. 
Goldstein, H., & Spiegelhalter, D.J. (1996). League tables and their limitations: Statistical 
issues in comparisons of institutional performance. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 
Series A (Statistics in Society), 159(3), 385–443. 
Grice, H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J.L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and 
semantics, 3: Speech acts (pp. 41–58). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
19 
 
Gross, K. (2008). Framing persuasive appeals: Episodic and thematic framing, emotional 
response, and policy opinion. Political Psychology, 29, 169–92. 
Hansen, K.M.; Olsen, A.L.; & Bech, M. (2014). Cross-national yardstick comparisons: A 
choice experiment on a forgotten voter heuristic. Political Behavior. Doi: 10.1007/s11109-
014-9288-y 
Herbst, S. (1993). Numbered voices: How opinion polling has shaped American politics. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hinrichs, J.V.; Berie, J.L.; & Mosel, M.K. (1982). Place information in multidigit number 
comparison. Memory and Cognition, 10, 487–95. 
Holzer, M., & Yang, K. 2004. Performance measurement and improvement: an assessment of 
the state of the art. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 70(1), 15–31. 
Hood, C. (2007). Public service management by numbers: Why does it vary? Where has it 
come from? What are the gaps and the puzzles? Public Money and Management, 27(2), 95–
102. 
Isaac, M.S., & Schindler, R.M. (2014). The top-ten effect: Consumers’ subjective 
categorization of ranked lists. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(6), 1181–202. 
Iyengar, S. (1990). Framing responsibility for political issues: The case of poverty. Political 
Behavior, 12(1), 19–40. 
Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D.R. (2010). News that matters: Television and American opinion. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Jacobs, R.; Goddard, M.; & Smith, P.C. (2005). How robust are hospital ranks based on 
composite performance measures? Medical Care, 43(12), 1177–84. 
James, O. (2011a). Managing citizens’ expectations of public service performance: Evidence 
from observation and experimentation in local government. Public Administration, 89(4), 
1419–35. 
James, O. (2011b). Performance measures and democracy: Information effects on citizens in 
field and laboratory experiments. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
21(3), 399–418. 
James, O., & John, P. (2007). Public management at the ballot box: Performance information 
and electoral support for incumbent English local governments. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 17(4), 567–80. 
James, O., & Moseley, A. (2014). Does performance information about public services affect 
citizens’ perceptions, satisfaction, and voice behaviour? Field experiments with absolute and 
relative performance information. Public Administration, 92(2), 493–511. 
Janiszewski, C., & Uy, D. (2008). Precision of the anchor influences the amount of 
adjustment. Psychological Science, 19(2), 121–27. 
Johnsen, Å. (2012). Why does poor performance get so much attention in public policy? 
Financial Accountability & Management, 28(2), 121–42. 
20 
 
Kroll, A. (2013). The other type of performance information: Non-routine feedback, its 
relevance and use. Public Administration Review, 73(2), 265–76. 
Levin, I.P.; Schneider, S.L.; & Gaeth, G.J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: A 
typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 76(2), 149–88. 
Malhotra, N., & Margalit, Y. (2010). Short-term communication effects or longstanding 
dispositions? The public’s response to the financial crisis of 2008. Journal of Politics, 72(3), 
852–67. 
March, J.G., & Simon, H.A. (1958). Organizations. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Mason, M.F.; Lee, A.J.; Wiley, E.A.; & Ames, D.R. (2013). Precise offers are potent 
anchors: Conciliatory counteroffers and attributions of knowledge in negotiations. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 49(4), 759–63. 
Moynihan, D.P. (2008). The dynamics of performance management: Constructing 
information and reform. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Mussweiler, T. (2003). Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and 
consequences. Psychological Review, 110(3), 472–89. 
Olsen, A.L. (2013a). The politics of digits: Evidence of odd taxation. Public Choice, 154(1-
2), 59–73. 
Olsen, A.L. (2013b). Leftmost-digit-bias in an enumerated public sector? An experiment on 
citizens’ judgment of performance information. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(3), 365–
71. 
Olsen, A.L. (2013c). Compared to what? Experimental evidence on social and historical 
reference points in performance evaluation. Paper presented at the 11th Public Management 
Research Conference Madison, Wisconsin, June 20–23, 2013. 
Olsen, A.L. (2015a). Citizen (dis)satisfaction: An equivalence framing study. Public 
Administration Review. DOI: 10.1111/puar.12337. 
Olsen, A.L. (2015b). “Simon said”, we didn’t jump. Forthcoming in Public Administration 
Review, 75 (2), 325–326. 
Osborne, D., & Plastrik, P. (2000). The reinventor’s fieldbook: Tools for transforming your 
government. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Perrin, B. (1998). Effective use and misuse of performance measurement. American Journal 
of Evaluation, 19(3), 367–79. 
Peters, E.; Vstfjll, D.; Slovic, P.; Mertz, C.; Mazzocco, K.; & Dickert, S. (2006). Numeracy 
and decision making. Psychological Science, 17(5), 407–13. 
Pettus, C., & Diener, E. (1977). Factors affecting the effectiveness of abstract versus concrete 
information. Journal of Social Psychology, 103(2), 233–42. 
Pope, D.G., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). Round numbers as goals. Psychological Science, 22, 
71–79. 
21 
 
Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive reference points. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 532–47. 
Simon, H.A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
69(1), 99–118. 
Simon, H.A. (1937). Comparative statistics and the measurement of efficiency. National 
Municipal Review, 26(11), 524–27. 
Simon, H.A. (1939). The administrator in search of statistics. Public Management, 21, 106–
109. 
Simon, H.A., & Ridley C.E. (1938). Trends in municipal reporting. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 2(3), 465–68. 
Smith, P. (1995). On the unintended consequences of publishing performance data in the 
public sector. International Journal of Public Administration, 18(2), 277–310. 
Steen, L.A. (1997). Why numbers count: Quantitative literacy for tomorrow’s America. New 
York: College Board. 
Stone, D.A. (1997). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making. New York: WW 
Norton. 
Thomas, M., & Morwitz, V. (2005). Penny wise and pound foolish: The left-digit effect in 
price cognition. Journal of Consumer Research: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly, 32(1), 54–
64. 
Thomas, P.G. (2006). Performance measurement, reporting, obstacles and accountability: 
Recent trends and future directions. Canbarra: ANU E Press. 
Van Dooren, W.; Bouckaert, G.; & Halligan, J. (2010). Performance management in the 
public sector. New York and London: Routledge. 
Van Ryzin, G.G. (2007). Pieces of a puzzle: Linking government performance, citizen 
satisfaction, and trust. Public Performance & Management Review, 30(4), 521–35. 
Van Ryzin, G.G. (2013). An experimental test of the expectancy‐disconfirmation theory of 
citizen satisfaction. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 32(3), 597–614. 
Van Ryzin, G.G., & Lavena, C.F. (2013). The credibility of government performance 
reporting. Public Performance & Management Review, 37(1), 87–103. 
Wildavsky, A.B. (1964). Politics of the budgetary process. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and 
Company. 
Williams, D.W. (2003). Measuring government in the early twentieth century. Public 
Administration Review, 63(6), 643–59. 
Zhang, Y.C., & Schwarz, N. (2013). The power of precise numbers: A conversational logic 
analysis. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(5), 944–46. 
Zillmann, D. (2006). Exemplification effects in the promotion of safety and health. Journal of 
Communication, 56(1), 221–37. 
 
22 
 
Biography: 
Asmus Leth Olsen is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His research focuses on the effects of performance 
information, political and administrative psychology, behavioral public administration, and 
experimental methods. His work has appeared in journals such as Political Behavior, Public 
Choice, and Judgment and Decision Making. Email: ajlo@ifs.ku.dk 
